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ABSTRACT 
 
The contemporary epistemic status of mental health disciplines does not allow the cross 
validation of mental disorders among various genetic markers, biochemical pathway or 
mechanisms, and clinical assessments in neuroscience explanations. We attempt to 
provide a meta-empirical analysis of the contemporary status of the cross-disciplinary 
issues existing between neuro-biology and psychopathology. Our case studies take as an 
established medical mode an example cross validation between biological sciences and 
clinical cardiology in the case of myocardial infarction. This is then contrasted with the 
incoherence between neuroscience and psychiatry in the case of bipolar disorders. We 
examine some methodological problems arising from the neuro-imaging studies, 
specifically the experimental paradigm introduced by the team of Wayne Drevets. 
Several theoretical objections are raised: temporal discordance, state independence, and 
queries about the reliability and specificity, and failure of convergent validity of the inter-
disciplinary attempt. Both modern neuroscience and clinical psychology taken as separate 
fields have failed to reveal the explanatory mechanisms underlying mental disorders. The 
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data acquired inside the mono-disciplinary matrices of neurobiology and 
psychopathology are deeply insufficient concerning their validity, reliability, and utility. 
Further, there haven’t been developed any effective trans-disciplinary connections 
between them. It raises the requirement for development of explanatory significant multi-
disciplinary “meta-language” in psychiatry (Berrios, 2006, 2008).  
We attempt to provide a novel conceptual model for an integrative dialogue between 
psychiatry and neuroscience that actually includes criteria for cross-validation of the 
common used psychiatric categories and the different assessment methods. The major 
goal of our proactive program is the foundation of complementary “bridging” 
connections of neuroscience and psychopathology which may stabilize the cognitive 
meta-structure of the mental health knowledge. This entails bringing into synergy the 
disparate discourses of clinical psychology and neuroscience. One possible model 
accomplishment of this goal would be the synergistic (or at least compatible) integration 
of the knowledge under trans-disciplinary convergent cross-validation of the 
commonly used methods and notions. 
  
 
 
PART I. Epistemological foundations 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the very historical definition for psychiatry (JC Reil, 1807) as a medical discipline there 
existed the explanatory gap originated by the mind-brain debate. 
There are two traditions that may be demarcated.  First, there is the medical tradition as found 
in anatomy and physiology.  Perhaps Thomas Willis (1621-1675) is the best known early 
modern practitioner of this science.  Willis studied the brain most carefully, and in fact compared 
a normal brain with the abnormalities he found in patients who had congenital mental retardation.  
His most detailed work on abnormal behaviors is Pathologiae Cerebri et Nervosi Generis et 
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Hypochondriacae (1670). Most often this tradition sees the brain to behavior connection as 
strictly causal.  In one version this tradition is ontologically reductive. 
The second tradition relates the brain (and other bodily workings) to the mind, and then the 
mind to behavior.  Perhaps the best known early theorist in this research was René Descartes 
(1596-1650), who in his Les Passions de l’Ame (1649) attempted to describe the bodily bases for 
human passions, and theorizing how unchecked passions lead to abnormal or excessive behaviors.  
Various types of relations are hypothesized in this tradition as to how the brain (and body) affects 
the mind, and as to how the mind then affects behavior. In this tradition the mind is often treated 
as a separate ontological kind, and is taken to have representational properties that are responsible 
for behaviors.  In some versions, the way in which the mind brings about behavior is held to be 
non-causal. 
Of course, there are intermediate positions, and some confusing attempts at combination.  One 
such would be the position of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who held that the mind was 
explanatorily independent from the brain, but not ontologically.  He held that one day we would 
be able to explain mental pathology in terms of brain functions, but until that time one needed 
independent mental constructs to explain the etiology of such pathologies. So Freud was not 
reifying the mind as a separate ontological entity, but did hold that it had due to its 
representational (or ideational) nature, the mind could be (and for therapeutic purposes had to be) 
discussed in ways independent of the physiology of the body. 
In 1807 Johann Cristian Reil coined the term “psychiatry”. The very etymology of this term 
suggests pure curative (iatreo: to heel (gr.)) nature of psychiatry, not necessarily associated with 
scientific causal explanations. To a great degree even current psychiatry remains basically 
“healing practice” that hasn’t developed yet normative disciplinary structure and language. Thus 
it remains isolated from many other areas of human knowledge. One further step was Wilhelm 
Griesinger postulate (1845) that mental diseases are in fact brain malfunctions. 
Yet at the same time the simplistic physical explanations (school of “somatics” and Jacobi) were 
opposed to the spiritual explanations of mental disorders, generated by religious traditions.  
‘Treatment’ was by exorcism, though in some forms this spiritual cause may be seen even in 
XIXth Century (‘psychics’ and Heinroth in Germany). 
In more contemporary times, the waning of psychoanalytic (and other theories of psycho-therapy) 
influence has been accompanied by increased work on the brain to behavior medical model. The 
rise of theories of about the roles of serotonin and dopamine typify this new version brain causing 
behavior theories.  But even this has expanded to include more physical causes than just the 
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brain; one large body of work is searching for genetic causes for abnormal behavior. 
Neuroscience has reported advance the functional morphology of the nervous system.  
But the other tradition has not died away.  Many neuroscientists are seeking the causal correlates 
on consciousness, which is held to have effects on behavior in ways different from bio-chemical 
causality. 
These problems became extremely significant at the end of XXc. when “scientific” psychiatry 
was proponed by Spitzer & DSM III (1974) and consequently in R. Kendell’s (1976) conceptual 
vision for psychiatry as a kind of “proto-science”. Thus special interest is to be paid to descriptive 
character (or phenomenalism in the common sense) of the international psychiatric classifications 
(that is, the so called ‘evidence’) in comparison to the scientific classification (or categorization) 
in the other fields of the natural knowledge, medicine and biology in particular. One contrast to 
be outlined is between psychological, psychiatric explanations which use ‘mental’ terms and the 
ordinary (traditional) medical diagnoses and explanations that are (almost wholly) put in physical 
terms. 
The transitional area between the genome and the phenotype (behavioral level) is occupied by the 
endo-phenotype (Gottesman et Al., 2003). It includes the whole diapason from the genetic 
diathesis to the clinical phenotypes, namely the brain metabolism and electrophysiology ex 
tempore (during task performance), chrono-biology, cognitive psychology and so on. Different 
endo-phenotype concepts were designed for schizophrenia and bipolar disorders (W.Drevets et 
Al., 2007). 
 
The aim of the present study is to examine the influence of neuro-scientific methods on the 
introduction of significant criteria for scientific diagnosis and explanations in psychology and, 
specifically, in psychiatry.  We intend to emphasize explanations for different mental states, with 
a concern for the diagnostic issues entailed; namely to study the relations between the explanatory 
and “diagnostic” (taxonomic) aspects of mental disorders. 
Our study is focused on the frame shift of scientific research in neuroscience from “exploring the 
brain itself” (pure neuroanatomy and neurophysiology) towards “exploring the mind-and-brain as 
“unified system in health and disease”.  
For this reason we introduce in the first section an optimal model of refined cooperation 
between basic disciplines (as biochemistry) and clinical cardiology in the sample case of 
myocardial infarction. It is compared then to the cognitive situation in psychiatry. There 
are adopted some preliminary regulatory definitions for the evidence strength in clinical 
psychology and psychiatry. The underdeveloped scientific status of the field is 
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demonstrated with a meta-empirical case study from biological neuropsychiatry. The core 
problem is addressed in a narrower scrutiny of one particular experimental design. It 
represents one presumably advantageous study of brain activity and clinical patterns. The 
major epistemic limitations are outlined as: temporal discordance (i), problematic 
reliability and specificity of the data acquired (ii) and lack of convergent validity (iii) 
between the constructs of neuro-biology and clinical psychiatry. In the next section we 
develop another case study in the field of clinical psychology. Having in mind the 
limitations of both approaches we suggest another complementary model for integrative 
or conformable dialog between neuroscience and psychopathology. In our perspective 
this theoretical model may affect in a great extent the current taxonomy, therefore 
diagnosis and treatment effectiveness. 
The quintessence of our claim is:  
 
(i) values and narratives themselves are an important counterpart of the psychiatric 
assessment but they are exposed to the risk of drowning into the floating sands of 
"understanding it makes it normal" or anti-psychiatry without rigorous scientific 
evidence basis. 
 
(ii) Current psychiatric evidence is nothing else but fragmented/ extracted from the 
context patent's narrative. Insofar there is questioned its reliability and validity, especially 
convergent validity with the data from other branches of mental health knowledge, such 
as clinical psychology and neuroscience. 
 
(iii) Neuroscience and clinical psychology seem not to care about convergent validity 
either. 
 
(iii) due to both poor evidence strength and interference of the values psychiatry remains 
a "proto-science" 
 
(iv) therefore we introduce the notion of "proof" (though in non-conventional sense), to 
say that we need convergent cross-validity of the facts emerging in the multi-disciplinary 
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matrix of psychiatry in order to stabilize its meta structure and set a prerequisite for the 
formulation of adequate meta- language. 
 
I.  
Let us start this preliminary theoretical exposition with a sample case, adopted from the 
clinical bio-medicine. This case is supposed to demonstrate in an appropriate way how 
the “ideal pattern” of epistemic configuration of the cross-disciplinary communication 
should look like as it regards the health sciences in general. 
 
Case study on bio-medical correlation in the example of Myocardial Infarction 
 
We assume several interconnected methodological levels of assertion. 
The first one entails the basic biological indicators (markers) associated repeatedly 
with the disease state. Dependent on the various medical issues these markers may 
involve methods and background data from genetics or from the epigenetic protein and 
metabolic processes. Those of the data concerned with genetics are state-independent and 
thus are sensitive to the health/disorder distinction but less specific as the clinical analysis 
demands differential diagnosis potential of the marker. The markers which originate from 
bio-chemistry (resp. clinical chemistry) are more specific when a certain abnormal state 
entails from environmental and multifactor influences. 
In the particular case of myocardial infarction such markers are: 
• Creatin - phosphokinase (CPK) enzymatic MB fraction and  
• Elevated concentrations of troponin. 
 
The latter are embraced as more reliable (in the sense of stability) and valid (in the sense 
of causal inference) markers for ischemic damage of the heart. Troponin protein is a 
cellular component, interacting with cardio-muscular contraction and its acute release 
into the peripheral circulation is always consistent with myocardial cellular death. This 
underpins a strong causal connection and causal inference. The statistical reference also 
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indicates at the relatively high rate exceeding 90 % of the diagnostic value of this bio-
chemical marker for acute phase of the myocardial infarction. 
Let’s say this must be the prototype of epistemic ‘proof’. 
The second level of methodological significance, which is presumed to validate the 
underlying (ongoing) biochemical processes indicators, is in the area of patho - 
physiological findings. In our case these are X-ray dynamic invasive examination 
records. It is an established common practice to assess the obstruction of the blood flow 
via coronary arteriography. This method may visualize the degree of the obstruction as 
well as to demonstrate other functional morphology in details (e.g. the functional capacity 
loss of the ventricles). It can also localize the specific region of the infarction. 
The third level of cross-disciplinary linkage is the level of the clinical observation and the 
self-report of the patient. Usually there exists a strict overlap of these three levels (or 
areas of knowledge) which asserts the clinical causal reasoning by inductive inference. 
This means that the clinical severity of the myocardial ischemia corresponds to the patho-
physiological findings as well as with the bio-chemical correlates. In this sense the facts 
from those three domains of exploration are cross-validating each other. They are also 
stable as it regards the repetition of the results, sensitive to demarcate health from disease 
and specific enough to differentiate acute infarction for the other forms of ischemic 
disease. 
Therefore the data from all three domains are incorporated in the classification diagnostic 
and treatment standards. 
  
II 
 
Having in mind this prototype “ideal case” of coordination between biological science 
and clinical practice, we aim at the development of similar pattern of cooperation 
between psychiatry and neuroscience. It is very important to stress beforehand on two 
essential aspects of our perspective. 
In first place, considering the high diversity of social and cultural values interfering with 
the natural evidence as well as the extraordinary complexity of the mental disorder we do 
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not advocate the establishment of an equipotent to the “myocardial infarction” model. We 
have no fundamental claim at identity or inter-theoretic reduction necessarily matching 
the classical ‘bridging law’ concept. Our goal is the achieving of either convergence or a 
conformable dialog between neuroscience and mental health disciplines. The integration 
and inter-play of the facts from both fields consists the scientific foundation on which any 
further diagnostic procedures are grounded. We can not develop for instance a 
“comprehensive assessment” (or values-based assessment in the terms of Bill Fulford and 
Juan E Mezzich) having not reliable and relatively stable scientific basis for explanation 
and understanding of disorder. 
Given the example of ischemic disease any further collection of knowledge, 
predominantly in the area of molecular biology does not discredit the conceptual 
explanatory model as described but only expands the knowledge towards novel and more 
advantageous predictive criteria, respectively point out relevant risk factors. This 
supports the prevention strategy in global public health. The very foundations of the 
causal explanation of myocardial ischemia remain relatively conservative. The new data 
emerging just complement the current explanatory constructs. So far the modifications in 
the classification and nomenclature systems seem not to touch in any way these 
foundations. 
What happens in psychiatry is that there do not exist any similar stable fundamental 
constructs which may integrate the cross-disciplinary structures (or at least improve the 
communication between the different branches) in the areas of interconnected concerns. 
Thus the very concept of the mental disorder and the consequential particular issues are 
challenged by many “paradigmatic” distortions which vary in the different cultural and 
national contexts. This reflects on international standards which appear to be only 
conventional. Therefore every revision in the “Mental and Behavioral Disorders” 
chapters either in ICD or DSM causes tremendous debate in the academic and 
professional community. 
As a result the everyday practice in psychiatry is governed by a multitude of divergent 
“rules” and incoherent concepts. It is given bellow the outline of a longitudinal history of 
a patient, which illustrates this incoherence. 
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T.P., 42 years old: academic background in the field of philosophy. He was admitted to 
psychiatric clinic for first time at the age of 22 in 1988. The diagnosis was a “catatonic 
form” of schizophrenia. It is worth stressing that the syndrome of catatonia has very 
distinctive clinical features compared to the other constructs in psychopathology. It 
requires psychomotor phenomena like stupor or excitation, accompanied by dreamy like 
state with picturesque experiences reported by the patient after the acute phase of the 
episode.  T. has been hospitalized a further four times in the next 20 years in different 
psychiatric hospitals each time his diagnose being revised. The range of diagnostic 
hypothesis varied from paranoid schizophrenia, through bipolar affective disorder to 
schizoaffective disorder. Any of these categories is supposed to have strong demarcation 
criteria as envisaged in the classification standards ICD and DSM. The revision of the 
diagnostic status has enormous consequences in the treatment strategy and most 
importantly in the long-term prognosis of the psychological and social functioning of a 
patient. 
 
Commentary:  Such “frame shift” of the diagnosis is similar to as if there was shift from 
e.g. “myocardial infarction with ST elevation (elevation of the ST segment in ECG)” to 
cardiac arrhythmia. Contrastingly to the arrhythmias the ischemic infarction entails many 
complications and severe prognosis, thus is liable to more aggressive and complex 
treatment. Although both states have some overlapping clinical presentations (arrhythmia 
may appear as a symptom of the infarction) they have strict and clear differential 
diagnostic criteria based on the biochemical and physiological tests mentioned earlier. 
Notwithstanding the serious medical aspects of the “scientific anarchy” in 
psychopathology, there are a number of other issues to be considered. Most of the 
psychiatric diagnoses should include a dimension of normative social function. This 
function is often represented in legal and economical terms. For instance 
psychological/psychiatric expert testimony may be considered as crucial expert statement 
in a criminal court trial Mental health enquiry is also a critical argument in the procedures 
for personnel selection. In these cases any expertise disagreements may discredit the final 
judgment. Usually any court sentence or psychological personnel assessment have 
significant social and economical consequences for the person involved. 
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This case illustrates probably in somewhat “mechanistic” manner the contrasts in the 
common practices and procedures among clinical bio-medicine and psychological 
medicine. In this context it is also an example for the underdeveloped scientific status of 
psychiatry (RE Kandel, KWM Fulford) or namely its status of proto-science. 
Our further scrutiny is attempting to construct an explanation for the “proto-scientific” 
cognitive situation is psychiatry via addressing the issues raised by the methodology and 
data on different levels of determination of mental disorder. Let me specify in advance 
that we prefer to avoid terminology like 'level' and 'hierarchy' because: 
(i) there is no attempt at solution of the ontological problems of the mind and brain in this 
program  
(ii) We are interested in how the scientific cross-disciplinary constructs (not the 
ontological kinds /properties) may actually interact in a synergistic manner 
(iii) this is why  we privilege the notion of "domains" or respectively 'disciplines' 
(iv) For these reasons we prefer to use a “horizontal” structure of inter-disciplinary 
cooperation rather than strictly “vertical” hierarchic structure.  
In this sense a mono-domain (mono-disciplinary, mono-level) explanations are 
demonstrated to be poor as opportunities of dialogue. There are many and different 
operators involved in mental health care problem solving (psychologists, social workers, 
and doctors). They come from diverse backgrounds and belong to distinct paradigmatic 
traditions. This is why it is of utmost importance to establish relatively compatible 
terminology and methodology between the different disciplinary languages in order to fit 
the general epistemic matrix of mental health care: let's say a "meta-language". An intra- 
correlative mono- disciplinary validity (as in clinical psychology) itself can not capture 
the whole picture of the mental disorder in its diverse complexity. Inter-disciplinary 
cross-validation is capable to enhance the "transcription" of the terminology and 
methodology and thus to enhance the dialogue between the mental health operators.  
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III. 
 
Now we shall focus on the theoretical premises for the ‘desired model for scientific 
psychiatry’ as proposed. 
Following Fulford, we divide mental health knowledge into realm of facts and realm of 
values. We also share Fulford’s view for ‘evidence based’ assessment as a counterpart 
(not an alternative to) the ‘values based assessment’ approach.  
Furthermore we assume the provisional division of the realm of facts into two 
interrelated domains which are supposed to differ in the level of satisfaction of the 
criteria for significance introduced in the above case study: stability, validity, sensitivity 
and specificity: 
• Proofs: facts which satisfy in equal extent the four criteria and  
• Evidence: facts which satisfy partially the four criteria, mostly stability and 
sensitivity. 
Of course the two categories we introduce are de-contextualized from their original use 
when applied to our field of interest. Traditionally epistemology recognizes proof as 
logically deduced conclusion in contrast to the evidence which is defined as empirical or 
inductive inference. This binary opposition is exciting in itself for further exploration for 
logic and philosophy of science. However it is not the subject of this essay. 
In order to clarify the working definitions we intend to further use in the following 
sections, let us illustrate the given meaning of the two notions two examples from fields 
of science and practice which do not belong to mental health in essence. 
• Narrative vs. terrain archaeology. It is an explicit fact from HPS that the 
narratives used in archaeology are often involved into contradiction with the 
physical findings (terrain digging). This was the particular case with Troy, when 
Schliemann’s excavations questioned the evidence available from literature 
sources such as “Iliad” (the archaeological narrative); 
• Judicial science and practice: courts tend to distinguish [contestable] evidence 
(when it refers to testimonial narrative) from proof (when it refers to physical 
evidence). Legal practice credits more the second type of evidence. 
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We prefer to address these particular cases because in psychiatry the implicit controversy 
is quite similar. Contemporary psychopathology is still based on self-reports of the 
patients and the observation of the clinician, which are much like the narratives of a 
testimony or “Iliad” by Homer. Anyone has his own personal perspective and assessment 
of the story and it depends on the rationale of the judge or the jury (in the case with 
judicial practices) to credit one version or another. In the same way you may have been a 
delusional person in the modern cultural and ethnical context of Western Europe and 
regarded as a profit in other times and cultural situations. This is one of the key 
arguments of the anti-psychiatry movement generated in XXc by Foucault and Szatz who 
understood mental illness as a “socio-cultural phenomenon” (Foucault) or simply as a 
“Myth” (Szatz).  
 Our emphasis is put on the radically embedded error of the so called ‘scientific’ 
psychiatry (including the theorists of DSM) which actually applies methods for 
quantitative assessment of the patient’s narrative. This is to say that for several decades 
experts believe that structured descriptive psychopathology is scientific. It relies upon the 
post-positivist concepts of C.G. Hempel and methods like self- assessment questionnaires 
(and personality inventories designed after the same model). These ‘clinical assessment 
tools’ are adjusted to easily and in a presumably “objective” mode collect data about 
subjective experience. But they do nothing else but retell the fragmented narrative of the 
patient pretending to have scientific structure (parted in scales and items)! The great 
multitude of such ‘clinical tools’ produces paradigmatic anarchy. Any method is assumed 
as valid if standardized with the same kind of method. The so called ‘external’ validity in 
psychology is supposed to be for example the correspondence of an IQ score with the 
evaluation (marks) of the student at school. In fact one inter-subjective method is 
validated with another subjective method! 
In order to be really scientific and produce creative dialogue at the intersection of the 
humanities and neuroscience, however psychiatry needs to reassess the very notions of 
validity and evidence because the currently employed ones (as is exemplified in the case 
studies in the paper) are (i) not scientific at all and represent (ii)”monopolist" streamlines 
that preclude any constructive cognitive pluralistic account of the mental disorder as 
complex phenomenon. 
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This is why we need a cognitive vehicle to "enable" the "translation" of the natural 
evidence into clinical practice and vica versa. And this cognitive vehicle in my agenda is 
the cross-disciplinary convergent validation which may delineate scientific "proofs". The 
proofs can bridge the explanatory gap and serve as prototypes for terms and notions of 
the "meta-language". The so called 'translational' neuroscience is promoting similar credo 
in the last few years but unfortunately it remains only a 'slogan' without any 
comprehensive intrinsic grasp of the problem.  
On the other hand judicial practice introduces one more level of significance (credibility): 
the physical evidence (often named proof). Terrain archaeology applies almost the same 
approach. We propose this type of distinction for psychiatry: any physical, biological 
evidence is indicated for clarity as a proof. And the rest of the facts need re-validation 
against the available proofs. 
It is crucial to underline that we do not privilege one method to the other! We 
introduce a pattern of corresponding validity of the data. In the same way as physical 
evidence (proof) may confirm the statement of the testimony, but the version of the 
testimony also sustains in some way the credibility of the physical evidence. The elevated 
troponin from our first case study is validated through coronary arteriography but 
coronary arteriography also serves as reverse confirmation of the validity potential and 
the specificity of the troponin test as bio-marker.  
The power of evidence is mainly statistical and is more dependent thus on the research 
framework. There is enormous and controversial database collected in different 
paradigmatic ‘windows’. Any frame shift or ‘switch’ from one paradigm to another 
compromises the extrapolation of the results.  At the same time psychiatry desperately 
needs secure facts (proofs) to improve its normative standards. The latter appear to be 
very weak and contestable due to permanent lack of grasp and mutual understanding 
between neuroscientists and mental health service operators. 
Our further enquiry focuses on the crossing dialogue between these two main domains of 
the realm of facts (see figure). 
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In future proofs may not fill the whole ‘explanatory gap’ existing in between the 
neurosciences and humanities dealing with mental health but hopefully may enhance the 
conformity of the dialog between the natural (neurobiological) and psychological 
branches. 
 
 
 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CORE PROBLEM (argument) 
 
          Case study from biological neuropsychiatry 
 
 
 
The overview of the neuroscience – psychiatry interconnections covers a wide and 
heterogeneous correlation analyses. Some of hem originate from the context of 
behavioral genetics and are directed to linkage of specific genetic polymorphisms with 
the findings of neuro-imaging (A. Hariri et Al.). Other studies claim at registration of 
neural activity phenomena corresponding with the narrative of the patient - guided or 
non-guided ‘introspection’ (Den Boer, Fuchs). These investigations bring to life the 
Mental Health 
Sciences 
FACTS VALUES 
Proofs Evidence 
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important connection between personal experience (phenomenology) and neuroscience, 
thus named neuro - phenomenology (Fuchs). 
Our modest meta-empirical analysis is though focused on another aspect of the interplay 
between in vivo neuro-imaging methods and psychiatry – the challenging area of clinical 
psychological tools. Clinical questionnaires (inventories) are trait and state- assessment 
methods which are widely applied in the arena of psychiatry. Presumably they carry out 
precise and thus incorporated in the clinical judgment information about the individual 
characteristics of mental disorder. There are introduced a large scale of definitions for 
validity and reliability of the clinical assessment questionnaires. Notwithstanding none of 
these definitions with the respective criteria included addresses the data of neuroscience 
(see previous exposition). Neither the clinical neuroscience is interested in establishment 
of explanatory connections with clinical psychology, except the domain in it, which 
examines the psychological features of organic brain damage (neuro-psychology). 
What happens in the current neurosciences – mental sciences dialog is that any of these 
two branches of science speaks its own language which seems to be untranslatable to the 
language of the others. As it was also stressed in one of our preliminary announcements 
(Machamer, Stoyanov, 2009), psychology and psychiatry puts all its terminology almost 
wholly in “mental terms” contrastingly to other fields in medicine, where the phenomena 
are defined in physical terms. The actual issue is related to the well known “explanatory 
gap” which exists in between neuroscience and psychological medicine. There are many 
theoretical and methodological conceptualizations of how is it possible to connect the two 
sides of this gap (Bolton & Hill, 2001, 2003, Broome et Al., 2009).  
We tend to believe that with the introduction of our model of cross-validation we may 
further contribute to this debate.  
This was our initial reason to select Drevets’ 2006 paper as typical example of an 
explanatorily irrelevant correlation between a clinical depression assessment 
psychological rating scale and the respective findings from high-resolution fMRI. 
This approach is considered as a prime example of one of the current patterns for a 
‘desirable’ collaboration between neuroscience and psychiatry. 
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Case study on Wayne Drevets’ assessment of serotonin transporter binding 
 
The main focus of their work is on finding the binding potential of the serotonin 
transporter receptor – a protein (neurotrnsamiiter) assumed by some to have substantial 
explanatory role in the pathogenesis (and treatment) of BAD. This is demonstrated using 
specific and selective radio- ligand assay in Positron Emission Tomography 3-D mode 
scanner. In other words the PET method applied is supposedly penetrating into the neural 
substrate of BAD. This research however is interested predominantly in the data 
acquisition about biding potentials. In their perspective, the psychological and psychiatric 
clinical assessment is just a kind of attendant data.  The latter is collected with some of 
the common used evaluation instruments: DSM IV structured interview, Montgomery - 
Asberg Depression Rating Scale, Hamilton and Beck’s Inventories. Psychological rating 
scales as well as the standardized interview usually consist of separate groups of items 
(questions, self-assessment statements, clinical observation reports). The authors 
presuppose the clinical data as consistent and perform the statistical analysis mainly of 
the imaging results and eventually post hoc correlation analyses of the clinical 
manifestations and the binding potential for serotonin transporter.  It entails from the 
presumption, that the clinical assessment data are simply attending the biological study 
and thus are not essentially encompassed in the research agenda. This is the reason for 
conducting of the imaging radio-ligand assay temporally apart from the clinical 
examination. We will argue that such a neuro-biologically centered design does not take 
into significant account the corresponding validity of the clinical and psychological data 
but takes them as given. Insofar these data present mere statistical correlation and any 
further valid causal and clinical inference grounded on them may be questioned as non-
legitimate. Besides it is worth mentioning also the fact that MADRS is not conventionally 
accepted for assessment of depression. Its major application is limited in Northern 
America. Another worldwide standardized tool is the McKinley and Hathaway 
depression scale from the Minnesota Multiphase Personality Inventory (MMPI).  
Now we shall further scrutinize the different essential limitations entailed.  
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1 
Arguments from chrono-biology 
The first methodological limitation of such research model is deficit what we call 
“temporal gap” or time discordance. 
This temporal gap between getting the PET data and administering the clinical depression 
test may affect the consistency of the correlations at least from chronobiological 
perspective 
It is not specified in the experimental paradigm layout when the clinical examination is 
supposed to be given.  Based on other papers presented in the field (Drevets et Al., 2007) 
we may guess it was given within the same day. Nevertheless as it has already been 
mentioned, many studies (Cornelissen, Halberg, Madjirova) demonstrate the instability of 
circadian rhythm of emotions, motivation, and hence cognitive performance as one of the 
cardinal features of BAD. 
It is challenging even to synchronize the actually presented mood features with any other 
parameter within the normal fluctuations of the biological rhythm, as illustrated on the 
next diagram:  
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On this diagram (Cornelissen, Halberg et Al. 2005) it is illustrated the circadian curve of 
the negative affect (axis). It is evident that even a temporal gap from three and more 
hours is associated with considerable change in the dynamics of the affect.  There are also 
many healthy individuals whose circadian regulation is defined as “arrhythmic”, i.e. 
instable (up to 45% of the population (Madjirova, 2005)). In other words PET and 
clinical assessment may actually detect two different emotional states. 
Furthermore in mood disorders it as practically impossible to synchronize the mental 
state with the neuro-biological investigation due to the manifest “desynchronosis” of the 
rhythms of affects and motivation unless the two measurements are performed 
simultaneously. Establishment of a simultaneous “double blind control” design will help 
to eliminate this confounding factor (see the end of the section). 
 
2  
Bio-marker’s specificity and grading potential 
  
So the instability of the rhythm may contaminate or distort the cross validation validity of 
the clinical and PET data. Such a confounding factor MAY compromise the grounds of 
any cross-disciplinary statement that he evidence of the Binding Potential for STR is 
reliable and valid grading correlate of the clinical severity of certain syndrome.  
Although such statement is not explicit the authors however conclude:” the elevated 
5HTT binding in cortex, thalamus, and striatum specifically [binding potential] 
correlated with the presence of anxiety symptoms [Beck Inventory Score] associated with 
BD…” Moreover curiously it is stated previously that the severity of depression ratings 
(MADRS score) “…did not correlate with the BP in any region”.   That difference is of 
immense importance because according to the clinical psychological protocol Beck’s 
inventory is designed for measurement of the severity of anxiety and MADRS - for 
evaluation of depression. The disorder in question is Bipolar Disorder - Current Major 
Depressive Episode. This means that there is no significant connection of the biological 
finding with the basic symptom of the mental disorder addressed. Insofar the second 
objection raised is that it was detected just the presence (vs. control subjects) not the 
grading of the anxiety. Eventually the authors simply elicit the presence of 
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accompanying symptom or from some point of view even an artifact! It is not helpful 
neither for the comprehensive diagnosis of BAD, no for the more precise drug choice and 
treatment plan. 
 In the same context if a bio-marker which is not registered ex tempore with the clinical 
phenomena it may be rather regarded as “surrogate” epiphenomenon than as specific 
causal correlate of disease. By definition any bio-marker must reflect on fundamental 
patho-physiological feature of disease. In order to detect the basic pathological process in 
the brain and in behavior as well a psychiatric biomarker should detect in a most precise 
way the characteristics of the mental state in real time. As it has already been shown even 
though Drevets’ experimental paradigm detects the brain process, it is not coherent in 
time and as conceptual content with the psychiatric examination and psychological 
testing. This is why it is impossible to use such data to assert an explanatory connection 
of neurophysiologic findings and clinical conceptualizations.  
Let me go in depth with this facet of the analysis.  In the case of myocardial infarction 
troponin level was correlated to a significant enough extent with the coronary 
arteriography. This correlation is the prerequisite for the establishment of a valid trans-
disciplinary explanatory connection. In particular it concerns the reconstruction of the 
intrinsic mechanism underlying the ischemic attack: obstruction of the coronary blood 
flow – myocardial ischemia – hypoxia – cellular death – leading to the release of cellular 
troponin into the circulation. This deterministic chain contains assertive reverse 
explanatory connection. Thus the latter could serve as a secure bio-marker of diagnostic 
significance, and if needed the specialist could skip the coronary investigation in 
situations where resources were scarce.. Often, though coronary intervention is indicated, 
the medical service may not have the necessary capacity in technological equipment 
and/or trained specialists to perform the invasive confirmation of the diagnosis. But the 
reliable and valid correlation of the arteriography and the increased level of troponin in 
the serum means it does not have to be performed (unless as therapeutic intervention), 
since the level of troponin is a reliable indicator. 
If extrapolated by analogy to clinical psychology and psychiatry, we should assume that 
the neuro-imaging or genomic data are relevantly correlated with the psychiatric 
diagnosis. However PET or MAUDI-TOFF (genomic scan apparatus) tests are really 
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expensive and most of the ordinary medical services can not afford them. This argument 
reflects the practical aspect of the medical knowledge. As it was outlined by Retsner and 
Gottesman in order to serve as a diagnostic biomarker it should meet a number of criteria 
in first place specificity and easy-to-perform non-invasive procedure. The ordinary 
medical specialist must have in availability a convenient test which can measure secure 
correlate of disease with minimum resources invested, including technical equipment, 
chemicals, time wise. [Economical reasons often motivate the search for reliable but at 
the same time cheep diagnostic tools. Another typical example in this sense is the 
Pappanicolau cytological screening for cervical cancer.]  Nonetheless we have no valid 
(i.e. referring to neuro-scientific findings) and reliable correlate of the pathological 
mechanisms underlying mental disorder. Drevets’ results can not be interpreted as such 
because the correlation established is with anxiety inventory (i) and more importantly 
because the statistical analysis does not indicate any specific values of the two constructs, 
binding potential and anxiety score (ii). So this conclusion is only a valid indicator for the 
presence the symptom, not for its grading! 
Further analysis revels that the post hoc statistical differences relative to control subjects 
range far from the expected significant p values. Therefore it is questioned in prima facie 
the reliability of the neuro-imaging data. Furthermore there is no reference to the clinical 
evaluation of the severity of the symptoms (anxiety and/or depression). It is disregarded 
the serious practical difference implied from the specific score of the psychological tool 
for the categorization of any mental disorder or psychopathological phenomenon. 
The most plausible reason for this poor statistical record may be presumed from another 
article of the same group (2007). There are reported PET data about the regional 
metabolism with 18 FDG (radio labeled glucose, included in the essential metabolism of 
the neurons) in patients with bipolar depression. It is specified that the ratings were 
obtained in the same day with the PET scan and give though completely unsatisfactory 
correlation of the regional cerebral glucose metabolism with the severity of depression. It 
is evident that the p correlation values are again border to significant. Even though the 
authors state it precisely that “……”none of these correlations would have remained 
significant after correction for multiple comparisons.” On the other hand mental 
disorder is by definition complex, multifactor state; thus multiple and diverse causal 
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mechanisms involved must be taken into consideration (D Bolton 2008, RE Kendell 2003, 
KF Schaffner 2006) 
Again we face double blind experience from a methodological point: the regional 
metabolic anomalies reported are not helpful in diagnostic and especially therapeutic 
issues (i) and the correlation as demonstrated is in most general outlines – as positive and 
negative (ii). Insofar such rough and statistically insignificant results can not help to 
highlight the explanatory connections between patho-physiological processes and clinical 
features observed in mental disorders. However there is collected enormous amount of 
similar contradictory and uncertain results in different branches of neuroscience genetics, 
biochemistry, physiology etc.  Most of them though remain only unproven hypotheses 
which are worthless for implementation in the current diagnostic and treatment 
procedures in psychiatry. 
One major epistemic error in this cognitive framework is the presumption that clinical 
data is the problematic property addressed and the neuroscience can deliver the 
confirmatory instrument capable enough to establish sufficient explanatory models. 
Actually both disciplines turn to be problematic in respect to their evidence strength. 
Therefore each of their constructs needs further cross-validation it in real time with the 
corresponding external independent constructs. Such approach may serve as a model for 
“proof” as stated before. The proof on its hand is the ultimate prerequisite for 
introduction of convergent validity among neuro-biology and psychological medicine.  
 
 
3. 
Convergent operations validity 
 
The crucial challenge before the neuroscience-psychiatry dialog is to create a certain 
model for equalization of the evidence strength among the corresponding databases of 
psychology and neurosciences. This can help for the formulation of “bridges” between 
the common used notions, methods and relevant information and hence to enhance the 
effective transference of data to clinical practice as it happens in the case with myocardial 
infarction. 
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Clinical psychological correlate may eventually replace the PET scan if there is 
satisfactory enough data for the convergent validity of the two constructs and their 
respective items in the same way as troponin concentration is replacing coronary 
investigation in many routine cases. For instance McKinley & Hathaway scale for 
depression assessment may relate to BP of 5HTTR in central brain regions in the same 
way as troponin is related to the coronary assay. In further perspective psychological test 
can help the drug treatment monitoring as specific phramaco-psychological dynamic 
indicator. 
The third problem arising in Drevets’ study as well as in many other similar scientific 
designs is that they are not addressing the problem of convergent operations validity. 
Such studies fail in demonstrating the real time correspondence of the psychopathological 
and neuroscience items.  In the terms of cross-disciplinary cooperation the two kinds of 
methods (in vivo neuroimaging and psychological tests) are two different operations. In 
order to integrate their results and make them conformable (translatable) it is required not 
only post hoc established statistical reliability and specificity but mainly cross-validity of 
the correspondent data.  
In our view there exist two kinds of connections of correspondent constructs:  
• Intra-correlative representing the connections inside certain disciplinary matrix 
(or domain of disciplines). The validation of mono-disciplinary constructs is 
predominantly statistical per se. One psychological method is validated 
statistically with another or a neuro-physiological method is validated with neuro-
biochemical test. This approach is sufficient per se for the regulation of the an 
intrinsic nomothetic network (notions, categories). 
• Inter-correlative constructs play the role of explanatory connections between 
different (diverse) disciplinary systems. It is not satisfactory enough to reveal 
statistical (quantitative) reliability between such properties. One supplementary 
demand is the establishment of trans-disciplinary explanatory convergence of the 
qualitative compounds explored. Therefore this kind of constructs serves as 
precondition for the integration of the respective nomothetic networks via 
convergent cross –validation. 
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Inter-correlative convergence facilitates interplay ability and mutual exchange of the two 
kinds of methods in situations of economical deficit. For the reason of introduction of 
inter-play ability it is of utmost importance the accomplishment of simultaneous 
investigation of the phenomena: in our case the 5HTT BP in the cortex and basal ganglia 
with MADRS (Montgomery - Asberg Depression rating scale). 
 
The reliability of the correlation (i.e. stability of the intra-correlative data collected) does 
not tell anything about its validity yet. Both domains of methods (from neurobiology and 
psycho-pathology) are characterized with limited trans-disciplinary convergence capacity 
of the cognitive content. The methods of neurobiology acquire specific high-
technological research information, put in terms of biochemistry and patho-physiology 
which is difficult for transformation into practical knowledge. When applied in cognitive 
neuroscience psychological tests such as Raven IQ matrices are given only in parts and 
thus are not regarded as convergent operations but just as stimuli. Besides the 
sophisticated protocol and immense cost of the neurobiological methods, there is no 
sufficient grasp in the current literature of their possible diagnostic or prognostic validity 
and utility as well. On contrary the methods of psychology and psychopathology deliver 
data for the clinical diagnosis which are put almost wholly in mental terms. Convergent 
validity as presented in contemporary psychological standards requires the validation of 
the constructs with another presumably independent but also psychological, (i.e. mono-
disciplinary intra-correlation) construct. Sometimes the validity construct includes 
sociological or other methods which however belong to the same domain of humanities. 
The only concept in psychology validated with external biological data is the theory of 
HJ Eysenck. Yet there are validated only several of its compounds (dimensions). This 
makes psychological assessment information irrelevant /inconsistent with the data of 
neuroscience and underlies the implicit discontinuity of the cognitive content among 
neuroscience and psychological medicine. On its hand the discontinuity obstructs the 
conformable dialog and inter-disciplinary cooperation. In terms of epistemology such 
results are no more than mono-disciplinary conditions (or law like statements). 
Therefore they are divergent and inappropriate for establishment of any type of 
explanatory connection.  Most of the contemporary findings in neurobiology are similar 
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in their cognitive content and therefore they can not be incorporated in any way into the 
international classification standards. 
 Another argument refers to the counterbalance of the experiment. The counterbalance is 
methodological demand given the abovementioned effect of “desynchronosis”. There are 
two time scale factors liable to elimination. One may register certain mind-and-brain 
pattern presumed as manifest depression on clinical level which correlates with the data 
of the receptor expression and binding potential in the brain. However it also may be 
false in cases when desynchronosis affects the adequate coordination/coherence between 
brain – body activity and the psychic experience. In terms of methodology the 
interpretation of validity is undermined by false positive input. The convergent validity 
could be established with the agency of two kinds of blind reports: 
• One experimental “blind” study of the brain activity compared to the respective 
results from the psychological evaluation performed thereafter and  
• One or two within 4 hours simultaneous control surveys in order to assert that the 
corresponding data are convergent indeed. 
In addition the longitudinal course, structured data from the lifestyle may also serve as 
external convergent validity operation. The life events in the patient’s history might be 
assigned with ranks /weight/ related back to the instruments of interest. 
 
In conclusion to this case study the strategic limitation of such designs is exactly the 
admission of the clinical tools (as structured interviews; Montgomery – Asberg; 
Hamilton and Beck’s scales) just for the reason of clinical assessment and thus its 
fragmentation from the other relevant data. However it is well known that mental 
states, either normal or pathological are very dynamical as well as are their neuro-
physiological correlates. Therefore such design can not contribute in any way for the 
integration of neuroscience and psychiatry and hence for the improvement and stability of 
the psychiatric diagnostic and treatment standards. 
As it is evident from this overview the more such neuro-biological studies are getting into 
depth with functional anatomical details the more they give a most superficial and rough 
account of the clinical psychological ratings. In this way they undermine the chances for 
integrative dialog with the real clinical practice. 
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Taking into consideration these limitations we propose another conceptual model for 
unification of neuroscience and psychological medicine.  
 
V. Case study from clinical psychology 
 
 
Current and historical theoretical backgrounds of clinical psychology and 
psychopathology 
 
As it has been stressed in our study many of the psychological tests are designed in a pure 
generic way. In most general perspective there are two methodologies in the construction 
of the psychological tools: “bottom-up” from items to scales and constructs and “top – 
down” from defining the construct to the scales and the respective items. The first 
algorithm is inductive and empirical and the second is deductive and intuitive in its 
essence. There are further refined three possible approaches for scales construction 
(Burisch, 1984): 
• External or empirical. Externalists distinguish types (or groups) of human 
personality and behavior, normal or abnormal without any claim at insight into 
the dynamics of verbal behavior in relation to the inner core of the personality 
(Meehl, 1945, Burisch, 1984). According to Meehl’s argument the peculiar 
narrative of the psychological test responses is a “verbal behavior of its own 
right” which is often separate from the subtle personality core experience.  Thus it 
is regarded to be related to non-test properties discovered empirically. In this 
perspective the scale membership of the items presumed is defined by factors 
external to the questionnaire itself. The common preliminary to item writing 
procedure is conduction of open-ended interviews with representative subjects 
from the target group (respondent population, Dawis, 1987). One standard 
recommendation of the empirical approach is to formulate the items in 
interviewee’s own language, which is supposed to deliver a certain level of 
authenticity and to contribute further to its validity. 
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• Inductive. Inductivists tend to invent the items or more often to borrow them from 
previous tests.  The ranging of the items and scales then is inferred from post-
processing of the data accumulated under the “blind” administration of the test. 
The initial pool of items is picked on a ‘random’ principle or according to some 
theoretical prerequisite from earlier scales. Then the questionnaire is administered 
in a pilot study to a sample population. The items are grouped (ranged) into 
different scales with assigning of differential weight using statistical formats such 
as the Likert method and the factor analysis. The basic procedure performed in 
Likert’s format is to select and group the items according to their ability to 
discriminate between higher and lower scores (ratings) on total score. Though the 
factor analysis and semantic differential suggest more sophisticated 
methodologies for item selection the clue assumption is the same: statistical 
assessment in arranging of the scales from the items included in the initial test 
pool.  
• Deductive or intuitive approach. Here the items are composed and the scales 
construed according to a common sense formulations. The main idea is that it is 
suitable to invent the items as hypostasis of the presupposed general constructs. 
Basically personality traits (i.e. the constructs such as ‘neuroticism’ or 
‘depression’) are determined beforehand in the terms of the everyday language.  
 
In summary the external approach composes the items from an initial pool collected from 
opened interview narratives and then groups them into respective scales supposed to 
discriminate different properties. The inductive approach adopts structural items from 
previous tests, applies them to the cohort groups and composes the scales and constructs 
on the basis of data analysis. In deductive approach the choice and definition of the 
constructs precedes the formulation of the items. 
Thus they have very poor or none at all theoretical basis but are construed in concepts 
adopted from the “folk” psychology unless the more sophisticated deductive approach.  
Of course there are also few exceptions such as the deductively constructed personality 
tests of Rorschach or Murray-Morgan (known also as TAT). On the other hand they have 
less or no practical application in the field of clinical assessment. These methods serve 
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mainly for the purposes of legal expertise (Rorschach) or social and organizational 
psychology (the method of T. Leary). At the same time they still suffer from various 
controversies with the norms (Garb, 2009), what compromises their utility. 
However the vast majority of the psychological assessment tools are standardized 
according to entirely “atheoretic” empirical procedure. In other words the items have 
been selected and keyed on the basis of their ability to distinguish diagnostic groups. The 
basis for the presumed “independent” assessment is actually the clinical judgment of the 
psychiatrist. The current diagnostic hypothesis is raised and developed under the 
dominant psychiatric standard and is then is supplemented with the clinical psychological 
results. It is assumed that the psychological inventories are validated back to the 
psychopathological constructs and forward to the psychosocial outcome of the treatment. 
Similarly, the external validation of a suicidal questionnaire is supposed to be the 
incidence of the suicidal behavior and the external validation of a personality traits 
inventory applied in personnel selection for the army is measured with the ratings of 
registered antisocial incidents on a mission.  
As it has already been emphasized previously, both kinds of dimensions lay INSIDE the 
domain of value-in subjective assessment of human psychology, namely the narrative. 
This is why they can not be credited as truly ‘external’ and ‘independent’ validity 
operations. We assert therefore that only value-free facts (such as neurobiological 
constructs) can play this role. 
This is exemplified in the case with one of the common used personality inventories: 
MMPI (Reddon, Marceau, Jackson, 1982). Addressing the particular topic of depression 
MMPI as one example of predominantly empirical scale construction (Hathaway and 
McKinley, 1938) has no explicit presupposition about the nature of depression. It relies 
upon the tacit clinical knowledge expressed in common sense formulations which 
correspond to the clinical reality. The main purpose of MMPI is diagnosis of personality 
disorders but separate scales of MMPI, as the depression and paranoia scale are also 
employed as independent measurements for other mental disorders.  
Let us enter now into historical reconstruction of the exemplary case with MMPI. This 
personality inventory was actually the first one to face the problem of validity and though 
it has been revised numerous times is still regarded as valued instrument in clinical 
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practice as well as in other kinds of psychological expertise. Addressing the particular 
topic of depression MMPI as one example of predominantly empirical scale construction 
(Hathaway and McKinley, 1938) has no explicit presupposition about the nature of 
depression. It relies upon the tacit clinical knowledge expressed in common sense 
formulations which correspond to the clinical reality. The crucial methodological claim 
raised by Starke Hathaway reminds in an exciting way the future claim of DSM III-TR 
(Spitzer, 1973). His model is free of “theoretical burden” and is referring to the clinical 
reality as it is. In other words it is “atheoretical” in the same sense as DSM III and is 
conceptualized in the framework of post positivist descriptions of the verbal (in the case 
with MMPI) and non-verbal behavior. The central method applied by Hathaway was 
extraction of the actual psychiatric patients’ responses to determine the direction for the 
item composition, scale construction and scoring. The method of contrasted groups was 
then employed in order to prevent the interference of theoretical rationale or intuitive 
guidance to contaminate the item selection. In practical terms there were compared the 
item frequency of endorsement among a group of patients (criterion group) judged high 
on the trait (say depression) and a reference normal group (or a type of control). Put in his 
own words, Hathaway aimed at “sampling of behavior of significance to psychiatrists”. 
The source for the initial pool was over 1000 items withdrawn from: 
• Contemporary textbooks and directions for case taking; 
• Guides to mental status examination and the respective protocols attached 
• Previously published tests/scales such as Humm-Wadsworth (1935) 
The selection of the final 504 items was a process guided in two ways: the personal 
clinical experience and training of the authors and the linguistic considerations. The 
former were directed to limit the repeated items to 25 content areas assumed to be of 
clinical interest and the semantic considerations included: 
• First person self-descriptive sentence declarative format of the items; 
• Simplified wording based on the contemporary word-frequency tables 
• Brevity, clarity and simplicity preferred to the grammatical precision 
 
As far as these constraints governed mainly the cognitive structure and the form of the 
sentences, we become interested in their cognitive contents as a sort of pre-theoretical 
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supposition for the item construction. For this reason we did a scrutiny of the 1930-1938 
publications in American Journal of Psychiatry. First of all it turned out that there was a 
guideline for diagnostic assessment: Revised classification of mental disorders (Statistical 
manual, 1934). This means that there existed standardized procedures and technologies 
for conducting and recording of a psychopathological interview. They differ of course 
from the later clinical practices but nevertheless allow the presentation of relatively 
structured data. We would like now to illustrate the outcome with the following samples 
from the original articles. The first record is from a paper published at the very time when 
McKinley and Hathaway started their project at the University of Minnesota. It is a 
publication on the language use in affective disorders and includes excerpts from an 
interview with the patient and subsequent language analysis. The following record 
represents an example for the contemporary attempts in elaboration of a structured 
interview. It is part from a publication on prognosis of mental disorder published in 1937 
by Bond and Braceland The last paper gives us the image of the third-person narrative in 
case report by Grover. 
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It is evident so far that the critical part of the psychiatric statement was formulated 
exclusively on the basis of the value-loaded third-person descriptive psychopathological 
protocols, quite similar to the common practice introduced the same time by the German 
and French psychiatry.  In practical terms the way McKinley and Hathaway justified the 
formulation of the items was deeply imprinted with the contemporary descriptive 
psychopathology and their own attitude to which particular excerpt from the narrative 
is or is not significant for the psychiatric assessment.  
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The instrument for the candidate item collection was structured interview: Hathaway 
himself summarized this as follows: 
“…the entire venture began because…we wanted to condense those long psychiatric 
interviews which were very expensive for the patient” 
This means that the goal of this inventory was determined in quite homologous way with 
the goal of DSM almost 40 years thereafter. Moreover according to Bucchanan (1994) 
the authors focused on their test’s potential to standardize psychiatric diagnosis. It is 
crucial for our analysis of the cognitive content to refer to another statement of 
Hathaway: 
“…no item was ever eliminated from a scale because its manifest content seemed to 
have no relation to the syndrome in question” (by Buchanan, 1994). 
This was entailed as a consequence from two facts: (i) McKinley and Hathaway relied 
upon clinical experience and training (their own or of their peer’s) in the item 
composition and (ii) they took it for granted that the contrastingly high clinical scores in 
the patient’s group compared to the reference group were indicative and strong enough to 
be interpreted as suggesting some form of psychopathology. 
Interestingly the same cognitive situation seems to take place in the previously given case 
from neurobiology: Drevets and his associates were registering phenomena of neural 
activity without any comprehensible relation to the syndrome in question!!!   
Back to contemporary use of MMPI its main purpose is the diagnosis of personality 
disorders but separate scales are also employed as independent measurements for other 
mental disorders such as depression.  A range of issues are raised by the kind of empirical 
approach implied in MMPI (Reddon, Marceau, Jackson, 1982):  
A range of issues are raised by this kind of approach:  
 
(i) Quite heterogeneous measurements which undermine the expert value of the 
diagnostic tools in many legal situations; 
(ii) Overlap of the measures and bi-variant prediction; 
(iii) No cross-validation of the item analysis, viz. the so called intra-disciplinary 
correlation inside the psychological domain; 
(iv) No theoretical basis for scale keys and interpretations 
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(v) Reliability and validity of the criterion measures under suspicion. 
 
Insofar many studies attempt to develop various statistical procedures for “factor 
analysis” following decomposition algorithms. Actually this type of redefinition of the 
test implies deletion of repeated or profile contaminating items and to some degree re-
formulation of the rest of the items. Moreover the discriminate and convergent validity of 
the scales is established with the use of statistical techniques of comparison between 
similar types of methods. In best case it is revealed within the framework of multitrait-
multimethod and factor analysis procedures. In this framework McKann (1991) pursued 
analysis of MMPI, MCMI (Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory) and the 
“measurements” conducted via assessment criteria for DSM III (Widiger, Wiliams, 
Spitzer, 1986).  A certain type of cognitive non-sense is introduced: quantitative clinical 
description of psychopathology is counter-validated with quantitative clinical 
psychological questionnaire. Technically the DSM assessment interview is driven from a 
similar if not identical type of cognitive content.  
Our basic claim is that practically a clinical interview for depression and a clinical 
psychological rating scale consist of same kind of cognitive content. The provisional 
difference is instantiated with two comparable complementary cognitive structures. 
The test is composed of self-evaluation reports (items) formulated as questions or 
statements. The psychopathological structured interview (e.g. DSM) is formulated in 
the terms of subjective experience indicated as symptoms (actually these are self 
reports recorded by the physician) complemented with the so called ‘signs’ or the 
presumably ‘objective’ observations of the overt behavior of the patient. However 
the cognitive content of the clinical judgment is beyond any doubt the same 
subjective as the narrative of the patient. Insofar none of the compounds of the 
structured psychopathological interview is independent to the inter-subjective 
system created in the situation of clinical assessment. Therefore repeated protocols 
from various clinicians which serve to sustain the reliability claim of the ‘scientific’ 
DSM can not be regarded as independent measurement for the cognitive content 
and the value of the psychological rating scales or vica versa. This means they have 
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identical or at least similar cognitive content and thus can play the role of independent 
validity operation for the other!  
Furthermore, in the context of our project there has not been demonstrated yet the trans-
disciplinary convergent validity of MMPI as well as other similar questionnaire tools.  
The previous dissection of the epistemic situation in neuroscience is very similar as no 
convergent validation with independent “external” to neuroscience methods is foreseen in 
the experimental paradigms conducted by the high technology neuro-imaging1. Thus 
most of the imaging research reports mainly empirical findings and can not capture the 
actual mechanism which underlies abnormal behaviors. Similarly DLPFC (dorsal lateral 
prefrontal cortex) is announced in different studies to be hypo-active (decreased 
metabolic activations in fMRI) both for psychotic and affective disorders (schizophrenia 
and major depression). One of the reasons for the inability of the conventional techniques 
to capture the mechanism is that it penetrates into the non-specific oxygen-dependent 
essential neural metabolic processes. Whilst the most probable candidates for explanatory 
mechanisms in pathophysiology of the mental disorders lie in the domain of the 
multimodal regulation neuro-chemical pathways and networks which might be localized 
in one and the same region according to the principle of multiple realization. As a 
consequence both psychopathology and neuroscience are governed by the scientific 
anarchy principle of “anything goes” (P. Feyerabend). This concern in a greater extent 
clinical psychology and psychopathology where hundreds of clinical assessment tools are 
invented and validated with previous questionnaires under the above-mentioned pattern 
of inductive construction of the scales. 
It has been demonstrated recently in the studies performed by H. Garb (2009, Garb and 
Cigrang, 2008), most of the validity claims for the psychological tests are problematic 
because of multiple reasons. They refer also to the few personality exploration tests with 
highly sophisticated theoretical background as the test of Rorschach (Garb, 2009). 
                                                 
1
 The one advantage of the information acquired from neuroscience to be considered is however 
the lower diversity of the methods and higher density of the data within smaller cohort groups 
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The disagreement emerging in the arena of clinical psychology is inescapably interwoven 
with the uncertainty of the procedures and underpinnings of the justification procedures 
performed in psychiatry.  
Insofar the conventional agreement standards in the development of DSM III-V (Aragona 
2008, 2009) also seem not to satisfy the claims for ‘scientific’ concept raised by the 
authors of DSM. There are several constraints (Stoyanov, Popov, Korf, 2008, Korf, 2008) 
which undermine the scientific value of DSM.  Even if we consider DSM as scientific it 
is neither falsifiable in the Popperian sense nor verifiable in the classical Aristotelian 
theory of the convergent truth. To this end there are no arguments strong enough to 
falsify/ verify the DSM or parts of it because of: 
 
(1) Publication bias; 
(2) Markers exhibit not enough power compared to the biomarkers in medicine; 
(3) No therapies related in clear causal relation with markers and diagnosis; 
(4) Brain not so deterministic to give strong causal relationships.2  
 
Therefore we depend on robust methodology in order to obtain markers with significant 
brain-to-behavior and reverse explanatory connection which can further support the 
diagnostic reasoning and categorization as well as the therapeutic strategies in psychiatry. 
In the 2002 research agenda of Kupfer, First and Regier for DSM V there are discussed 
inter alia in one of the chapters the possible contributions of neuroscience. Anyway no 
satisfactory model for synergistic cooperation of psychopathology and neuroscience is 
exposed. 
 
As a conclusion to this case study: 
 
(i) We still need some source of external validity able to meet the "moral imperative" for 
turning psychology (hence psychopathology or at least a part of it) into a "robust science" 
('Nature' editorial, October 2009). As it has been stressed several times in the essay this 
                                                 
2
 We address here the traditional localization view for determinism 
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imperative comes from the normative functions of psychiatry in many critical areas of 
expertise, i.e. the demand to establish cross-culturally relevant norms in order to prevent 
abuse  
(ii) psychiatry is not unitary science but an inter-discipline, therefore it can not count sole 
on qualitative comprehensive values-based assessment though it should be aware and 
respect the values. The inter-disciplinary structure of psychiatry involves many facets 
from neuroscience which is regarded as one possible source of external validity. 
Neuroscience shares same notions and categories with psychopathology. But there are not 
introduced any relevant rules for "translation" of the data among these inter-connected 
domains of common interest. 
 
If the case is a relatively homogeneous science (mainly in ontological sense, but also as 
domain 'location' of the explanatory mechanisms involved), then you might be skeptical 
about the possible value of the external validity. This is the case with many social 
sciences as well as many subareas of psychology such as social psychology. Their 
explanations vary inside the domain of humanities as far as they are concerned in 
quantitative assessment of human behavior. Note that even within e.g. sociology there 
exists a debate between experts who prefer to credit quantitative approaches 
(sociometrical) and those who believe it is impossible to capture in a 'scientific' manner 
the human relationships and the group interactions as well. The latter refer mainly to 
ethno-methodology (Garfinkel) and logic of the practice.  
The problem with mental health is much more complex because we have more 
sophisticated disciplinary infrastructure, which is adopting data from divergent and very 
often incompatible domains of knowledge. So whilst a debate like the one in sociology 
counts on the intrinsic tensions and shortcomings of the different schools and 
conceptualizations, in psychiatry (and clinical psychology) it is related to different 
levels/domains of explanatory connections referring to the same terms and taxonomies. 
Psychiatry and clinical psychology will always exhibit or imply some 
inextricable ’understanding’ component. At the same time they are heterogeneous inter-
disciplines which share various interconnections with biological sciences (neuroscience) 
of real practical significance. If you have certain type of destructive harmful behavior (as 
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violence) it is culturally irrelevant and incontestable as a subject of normative 
determination. As soon as it is determined abnormal and delusion-motivated it is liable 
usually to biological intervention based on assumptions adopted from neuroscience. 
 
 
CONCLUSION to part I 
 
According to our proposal we take the best existing clinical standard in the model of 
convergent cross-validation with the data of neuroscience and then get back to the 
clinical evidence in order to improve it. 
 
We may regard this program as a radical "frame shift": then we need not to reconstruct 
past behavior/brain of other people, but you launch a novel and proactive research 
framework: an agenda to completely rebuild the taxonomy and therapy in psychiatry. 
 
We have two measures (clinical and biological) considered as valid for different 
reasons. They are valid however inside their own divergent domains (disciplinary 
matrix) and thus are not liable for “translation” to the other. The simultaneous 
cross-validation is supposed to be the cognitive ‘vehicle’ to address a possible 
resolution of this problem. Any convergence of clinical assessment and 
neurobiological data will provide synergistic explanation for the mechanism of 
production of the disorder and facilitate the inter-domain translation. 
 
There are some reservations applied to this model, namely: 
(i) Psychological explanation itself is not "commonsense"; it has the claim at scientific 
validity 
(ii) We examine the 'interface' between scientific psychology, cognitive neuroscience and 
psychiatry not for the interface with the commonsense (or folk) psychology  
(iii) therefore the problem is entirely situated inside the so called "explanatory" domain: I 
do not expect to 'create' interface with the values and narratives as they represent to a 
great extent the common sense. The values and the narratives of the common sense are 
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another and quite important counterpart of the psychiatric assessment and case 
management. However if one counts on the values only as ultimate epistemic construct 
for understanding of mental disorder it will lead to nothing else but anti-psychiatry 
(iv) insofar I address the problem of convergent cross-disciplinary validity as a problem 
of the cognitive meta-structure of the explanatory disciplines. In my perspective they are 
supposed to give a relatively stable ground to be superposed with the comprehensive 
assessment of the narrative. This "scientific basis" has nothing to do with the current 
categorical taxonomies of DSM and ICD but is mostly complementary with the idea for 
broad diagnostic prototypes. (Mezzich et. Al 2005). In the terms of Schaffner my 
program is a quest for a type of "reductive ethio-pathogenetic validity", which may 
bridge the explanatory gap between humanities and neuroscience. It is supposed to be 
complemented with the "clinical validity", which actually includes the person-centered 
comprehensive assessment. 
The simultaneous in extenso cross-validation is one complementary approach for the 
establishment of interconnections of the common used notions and categories, in other 
words a type of bi-conditional rule for translation of the data of neuroscience to 
psychopathology and vica versa.   
  
On one hand this may eliminate to a greater extent the stochastic factor and the 
informational “noise” in the system. On the other it may facilitate the equalization of the 
evidence strength of the biological and psychological methods, consequently their inter-
playability directed to economy of resources. 
It needs to be emphasized that strong evidence (matching the criteria of specificity, 
sensitivity, validity and reliability) is the necessary foundation for the establishment of 
bi-conditional law-like constructs. A valid bi-conditional connection is the prerequisite 
for at least conformable dialog (i) or integration of neuroscience and psychological 
disciplines as well (ii). It may further expand the fields of exchange and interplay ability 
of the methods and data, respectively can enhance the unification of the common used 
scientific terms and criteria for validity. Finally the inter-play ability and unification 
underlies the possible effect of minimization. Minimization is directed to collection of 
maximum significant data with minimum recourses capacity invested. Basically in the 
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case of psychiatry this means revision (re-validation) of the clinical psychological 
assessment tools according to the evidence from the simultaneous cross-validation with 
neuro- imaging methods. As an outcome we shall have reliable but inexpensive 
instrument for exploration of mental disorders. These results can also affect the 
prevention and the treatment, especially the drug choice and therapeutic monitoring. 
 
The critical point in this proposal is that both psychiatry and clinical psychology claim at 
evidential 'explanatory' component without neuroscience. 
Here is the contribution of our program in this context:  
 
1). Psychiatry and clinical psychology can not drive their claims for evidence validity 
from narratives. Narratives represent the values, evidence represents the facts. The facts 
of psychiatry are derivative from narratives; therefore they should not be regarded as 
evidence, but as fragmented de-contextualized narratives. 
 
2). Psychiatry and clinical psychology share interconnected concerns with neuroscience 
and this is why they basically need cross-validation with facts anchored in neurobiology. 
This can define prototypes of real evidence, where both domains are mutually informed. 
The evidence strength is granted with my framework of equivalence, where the clinical 
psychological tools and neurobiological scan are regarded as convergent validity 
operations and none of them is privileged to the other. 
 
Let us repeat again that this model does not affect the values counterpart of the clinical 
assessment. Its goal is only to provide stable fundamental explanations and taxonomy as 
the current ones seem deeply controversial and unstable. Without reliable and valid 
taxonomical apparatus and underlying explanatory connections to address the subtle 
mechanism of disorder psychiatry is governed by "anything goes"  - complete epistemic 
anarchy (Stoyanov 2009) as well as the value loaded principle "understanding it makes it 
normal" (Gurova, 2010 forthcoming, Meehl,1968). The final outcome from such 
cognitive situation is anti-psychiatry or socio-political abuse with the instruments of 
psychological and psychiatric assessment. Taken as sole approach to the mental health 
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values - based assessment has not enough epistemic potential to fix either of these 
dangerous outcomes. 
Our goal is not some sort of obsessive "hyper order” but a cognitive situation of extended 
probability and coherence of the nomothetic networks in mental health. If we apply 
metaphors from political engineering, the current situation should be described as 
"scientific anarchy" whilst we should aim at a status of "scientific democracy" or 
cognitive pluralism in philosophical terms. However pluralism should be at the extent of 
compatibility of the different views, not necessarily their unification. 
 
There are three possible routes resulting from such investigation synergy. 
• The one of them consists in discovering more similarities than differences 
between the schizophrenic and the bipolar spectrum. This will bring to a new life 
the classical views for the “unitary endogenous psychosis” of Zeller-Neumann-
Griesinger and Klaus Conrad’s concept in modern times. 
• The second route is revealing true nosographic borders of the diagnostic 
ENTITIES in psychiatry which may lead eventually to its medicalization (we 
prefer the notion of ‘scientification’). 
• And the third opportunity comes to be the maintenance of the discursive dialog in 
the areas of psychological medicine and neuroscience. 
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PART II: Cross-disciplinary validation of the common used       
notions and methods in psychiatry and neuroscience 
           (Methodological underpinnings of proactive project proposal) 
 
 
Major premises: 
 
Both modern neuroscience and clinical psychology taken as separate epistemic entities 
have failed to reveal the explanatory mechanisms underlying mental disorders. The data 
acquired inside the mono-disciplinary matrices of neurobiology and psychopathology is 
deeply insufficient regarding validity, reliability, and utility. There haven’t been 
developed any effective trans-disciplinary connections between them as well.  
One possible model for cooperation is a synergistic integration of knowledge using trans-
disciplinary convergent cross-validation of the common used methods and notions.  
The major goal of our program is the foundation of complementary “bridging” 
connections of neuroscience and psychopathology which may serve to stabilize the meta-
structure of the mental health knowledge. 
 
MOTIVATION: 
 
Review of the contemporary state-of-art 
 
1. Findings in healthy individuals 
 
Our project’s rationale rests on the emerging data from cognitive neuroscience viz. Canli, 
Zhao, Rubino, Christoff, etc. There is considerable database collected in the experimental 
paradigm of the dual-task problem solving including the IQ test of Raven, Tower of 
London, Tower of Hanoi, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and other problem solving tasks.  
• Besides the cognitive functions, a paradigm of personality influences on brain 
reactivity to emotional stimuli proposed by Damasio (1997) was used in the work 
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of T. Canli (2001). In it, responses to pictures from the International Affective 
Picture System (Lang and Greenvald, 1993) were correlated successfully with the 
personality scores determined with Neo-Five factor inventory (Neo-FFI3). (The 
FFI was administered after the scan procedure.) For instance, extroversion was 
found to correlate with the level of activation to positive compared with negative 
picture series, especially in the anterior cingulum, amygdala and other structures 
of the meso-limbic system. Neuroticism was linked to the levels of activation in 
the left temporal and frontal lobes. predominantly to negative pictures  
• Another important consideration arises from the results of Fischer et Al. (1997), 
who compared specific basal ganglia activation to extroversion and neuroticism in 
the paradigm of HJ Eysenk.  In this experimental design though the personality 
and brain explorations were conducted separately from each from the other, the 
authors give us a hint of awareness that the temporal gap between tests and 
imaging matters.4. This model is quite promising considering that Eysenck 
himself has predicted in his theory published in 1967 the brain arousal as neuro-
correlate of the dimensions defined in his inventory (EPI).  
• A meta-analysis of the subsequent developments in the investigation of amygdala 
activation during processing of emotional stimuli conducted by Costafreda et al. 
(2008) indicates significant predictors of distinction between the responses to 
emotional and neutral stimuli. The magnitude of amygdala reactivity to negative 
emotional stimuli was found to be greater than to unspecified positive emotions. 
Another conclusion driven from the same systematic review of 385 PET and 
fMRI studies are that external stimuli seem to be prioritized over internally 
(imagining) generated ones.  
• In other work, especially of Rubino and associates (2007), there is a positive 
correlation between the measured medial prefrontal cortex activity and the phobic 
proneness response in individuals who were exposed to fearful and threatening 
facial stimuli during the fMRI scan. In addition they found a positive association 
between the personality style assessed with PMQ (personality meaning 
                                                 
3
 The Neo-FFI (Costa and McCrae, 1991) concept is derivative from the paradigm of HJ Eysenck (1969). 
4
 This study is considerate about the time interval as it is specified that all the investigations were 
performed between 11am and 3pm 
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questionnaire) and the differential modulation of the prefrontal cortex activity 
during cognitive evaluation of emotional stimuli.  
• The most recent report of the Hariri group (2009) further contributes to this 
mainstream work in “affective” neuroscience. They examined the relationship 
between individual differences of typical reactions to instructed or spontaneous 
emotional reappraisal and predictions of the responses in the distributed network 
of the amygdala and prefrontal cortex. Four blocks of perceptual negative 
emotional face processing were used as stimuli. The imaging results were then 
correlated with the scores of the reappraisal scale in ERQ (emotional regulation 
questionnaire), administered before the fMRI scan. According to their data 
acquired the self-reported reappraisal predicted decrease of the amygdala 
response activation and higher activity of the prefrontal and parietal cortical 
regions.  
 
2. Findings in mentally ill individuals 
 
• A number of recent reviews implicate the neural networks of the limbic-cortical-
striatal-palidal-thalamic neural circuits which normally regulate the evaluative, 
expressive and experiential aspects of human behavior as well being the 
pathophysiological substrate of the affective disorders (Phillips, 2003, Drevets, 
2008). 
• These findings in groups of healthy individuals are consistent with a recent meta-
analysis of the brain activations in depression (Fitzgerald 2008). The major areas 
of activation are summarized as they are recorded under the following conditions: 
rest, treatment, induction of positive and negative affect. Despite the complexity 
of brain – behavior regulation and the diverse imaging methods applied, it was 
claimed that determined patterns of considerable change in distributed brain 
regions are involved in the depressive disorder and may be positively identified 
with the neuro-imaging techniques. Basically these regions belong to the same 
cortico-limbic circuit as described in healthy individuals: DLPFC, pregenual 
anterior cingulate, insula, superior temporal gyrus, etc. 
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• In terms of neuro-chemical correlates, this system is operating mainly with 
serotonin, acetylcholine and modulated by glutamate and co-existing substances 
as endorphins. Central serotonin system, specifically postsynaptic 5HT 1A and 
5A subtypes receptor deregulation is connected with depressive disorder in 
population genetic and genomic studies (Hariri, 2009, Stoianov et. Al. 2009), in 
vivo neuro-imaging (Drevets, 2008, Neumeister 2004), and in post-mortem neuro-
pathological findings (Stockmeier 2003).   
• Pharmacological citalopram challenge. fMRI results in the paradigm of Anderson 
(2008) also indicate anomalies of serotonin mediation at pre-synaptic level, 
namely of the 5HT 3C receptor regulation. This hypothesis is consistent with ex 
juvantibus data from the treatment of depression with selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRI). Basically this is our argument for the implementation of 
citalopram challenge in the experimental group of depression. 
• There was recently introduced the Olanzapine challenge for investigation of the 
human reward mechanisms (Abler 2007) in healthy individuals as well as for 
assessment of the cortical function and longitudinal clinical outcome indicator in 
relation with COMT genotype in patients with schizophrenia (Bertolino 2004). 
One important methodological emphasis of our project is that most of the 
generalized “mono-transmitter” reductive theories like the Dopamine hypothesis 
have experienced historical failure (Kendler, Schaffner, in press).  This is why we 
need informative “connectivity” model for exploration of the mental disorders. 
Olanzapine challenge is suitable for the purpose because (i) it is serotonin-
dopamine antagonist (SDA), in other words it represents selective bi-modal 
ligand, affecting simultaneously two neuro-chemical systems; (ii) it is indicated 
for the treatment of both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (especially mania 
syndrome). Another critical consideration entailed is that the neural pathways are 
not simply ‘enhanced’ or ‘inhibited’ as it was stated in many 
psychopharmacological theories, but deregulated as complex compounds of the 
whole neural network. For this reason we introduce multi-channel alternative 
instead one-channel working hypothesis, 
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• These arguments are coherent with the aberrant salience theory (Kapur 2003). 
According to Kapur [dopamine] is mediating the salience of environmental events 
and internal mental representations. Although salience theory is supposed to 
create heuristic framework linking biology, phenomenology and treatment of 
schizophrenia, it is plausible as a conceptual explanatory model for other mental 
disorders as well.  
 
In summary the cognitive and clinical neuroscience of emotions and personality is 
concerned with correlating brain images and cognitive tasks or assessments, but questions 
about the external validity of such correlations remain. Though sometimes especially in 
cognitive science, the tasks and stimuli are presented with fMRI (subjects were in the 
machine at the time the tasks and stimuli were presented) the procedure is exclusively 
empirical: focused on correlation of the disparate properties of cognitive performance and 
neuroimaging. Particular experimental designs address narrow problems of cognitive (or 
emotional) stimuli processing. Insofar psychological cognitive tasks are not performed 
totally (i) and the research agenda has no validation objective (ii). In other words the 
psychological tests or emotional pictures in these methodologies serve only as inert 
stimuli. Further, most of the above listed methods are not routine clinical assessment 
tools in psychiatry (with the exception of the Raven IQ test). Nevertheless these results 
are quite encouraging because they have positive predictive value as it regards our 
experimental proposal.  
 
Therefore our basic hypothesis  is that if visual (facial) stimuli exhibit certain patterns of 
brain cortico-limbic brain circuit activity then the items of MMPI scale regarded as 
verbal stimuli should also serve to elicit specific areas a brain function that are thought, 
for theoretical reasons, to be part of the mechanisms by which these disorders are 
produced. We may complement them with another, more “clear” visual stimulus as well: 
the color personality test of Luscher.  
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Review of neuroimaging techniques 
 
1. An examination of the modern neuro-imaging developments indicates that PET is 
inconvenient to perform when an extended task, e.g. a depression rating scale and 
or the test of Luscher, is required. Concerns include (i) the patient’s exposure to 
ionizing radiation and (ii) the relatively short time of elimination of the radio-
ligands from the brain receptors making this a bad measure for the administration 
of a lengthy psychological test. 
2. fMRI also does not meet the requirements of our proposal. It is not specific or 
selective enough to illuminate the neurotransmitter dynamics which underlie the 
metabolic activation thought to be involved in psychiatric disorders. This means it 
can not register the subtle mechanism thought to be involved and thus cannot 
provide a sufficient explanatory account in terms of purported mechanism for 
production for the disorder. Moreover according to the argument of Korf and 
Gramsbergen (2008) the BOLD signal actually detects restorative processes, 
rather than productive processes, i.e., those that preserve the iso-energetic 
balance of the brain after performance of certain tasks. The same problem 
arises with 18FDG PET assays on metabolic utilization of glucose. fMRI results 
may give an account of an effect, but not of the causal mechanism that brings 
about the disorder. Thus, their relation to diagnostics and therapy of mental 
disorders is unclear.  
 
We prefer to privilege Pharmaco - fMRI (Deakin, Anderson, 2002, 2008) as an 
alternative because: 
• It detects a BOLD signal under specific modulator or challenge conditions (when 
specific drugs are administered) similar to the actual treatment substances agents. 
In this context pMRI might be used to measure the effects of drug action during 
certain tasks or in the presence of certain stimuli..  
• There are emerging recent results from studies with number of agents: mCPP as 
an agonist of the serotonin auto-regulatory receptors (Anderson 2002), their 
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antagonist citalopram (Anderson 2008); second generation SDA antipsychotic 
olanzapine (Bertolino 2004, Abler 2007) vs.  Placebo controls.  
• Easy to repeat scanning without exposition to ionizing radiation. 
• At the same time pMRI includes higher levels of spatial and temporal resolution 
and therefore time-and-region sensitivity of the drug effects (Ragland 2007). 
 
 
Theoretical rationale: 
 
Taking into consideration the limitations of the currently employed methodologies and 
experimental designs we propose another model for unification of neuroscience and 
psychological medicine; namely simultaneous cross-validation of the neural and mental 
phenomena. It may facilitate the enhancement and equivalence of the evidence 
strength among the biological and psychological methods. As a consequence their inter-
playability will economize resources: revalidated clinical measures could be strong 
enough as the neurobiological markers.  The simultaneous administration of the whole 
scales – in extenso cross-validation is one complementary approach for the establishment 
of interconnections of the common used notions and categories, in other words a type of 
bi-conditional rules for translation of the data of neuroscience to psychopathology and 
vice versa.   
 
We expect strong evidence for relevant correspondence (convergence) with brain neuro-
imaging and the following psychological battery of clinical significance: 
• McKinley and Hathaway scale for depression from the MMPI and 
• MMPI scale for paranoia. 
• Luscher color personality test. (optional) 
• Common used in clinical practice cognitive methods such as “Simple and 
Complex Analogies” test. (optional) 
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Justification for the emphasis on the McKinley-Hathaway depression rating scale: 
 
The McKinley and Hathaway scale is actually one of the instruments employed in the 
overall MMPI. Our further arguments are as follows: 
 
• The MMPI is a multi-axial (multi-phasic) inventory, presumably able to identify 
differentially the behavioral properties of several major diagnostic entities: depression, 
paranoid schizophrenia, and more importantly personality disorders. If our goal was the 
identification of only depression, then of course Hamilton, Zung or Derogatis are more 
suitable tools. However according to our definition the posed objective is to cross-
validate a number of different candidate "prototypes' of diagnostic items with respective 
neuro-biochemical markers in order to set explanatory inter-domain connections. The two 
clinical rating scales are commonly used to diagnose two major prototypes of the 
psychiatric categories: bipolar disorder and schizophrenia as well as depression. In this 
sense MMPI encompasses broader diagnostic issues than isolated depression rating scale.  
We hope to highlight the differences between brain signatures of the different 
prototypes brain disorders 
• MMPI is widely applied in "sub-areas" of psychiatric and psychological expertise: 
probably the most crucial is the personnel selection for the army;  
• Historically MMPI is one the first empirical clinical inventory and many subsequent 
"inductive" inventories adopt some items and ground their validity claims on correlation 
with the MMPI scales;  
• MMPI was designed on the basis of structured psychiatric interview, similarly to the 
DSM structured interview. So on one hand it is broad and relatively sensitive diagnostic 
tool, on the other it lacks a really "independent" source of external validity. 
 
Justification of the employment of the Luscher color test:  
 
• This method is assumed to be very sensitive in evaluation of emotional reactivity and the 
functional mental states. 
• It has also biological and physiological theoretical background, similarly to Eysenck PI.  
• Most importantly it represents single color tables: this may reduce the “noise” in the 
system via minimization of the cognitive processing of the input information. Particularly 
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the clarity of the stimulus is entailed from the elimination of the gestalt phenomenon 
(figure/background) and thus may preserve a shortcut to the emotional processing. 
 
Contrastingly to modern neuropsychiatry in our paradigm is aiming at promotion of 
convergent and integrative assessment of the entire mind-and-brain mechanism 
underlying mental disorder. This is why the clinical assessment tools are not regarded 
only as inert stimuli but also as convergent validity operations.  
Another critical facet of our experimental proposal is the simultaneous survey of the 
neuro-biological functions and their mental correlates. That is, the instruments of 
psychiatric assessment should be administered while the patient is being imaged. We 
underpin this aspect of the protocol with the temporal gap argument. 
This temporal gap between getting the imaging data and administering the clinical 
depression test may affect the consistency of the correlations at least from 
chronobiological perspective. Even a temporal gap from three and more hours is 
associated with considerable change in the dynamics of the affect (Cornelissen, Halberg, 
2001).  There are also many healthy individuals whose circadian regulation is defined as 
“arrhythmic”, i.e. instable (up to 45% of the population (Madjirova, 2005)). Furthermore 
in mood disorders it as practically impossible to synchronize the mental state with the 
neuro-biological investigation due to the manifest “desynchronosis” of the rhythms of 
affects and motivation. In practical terms the imaging and the clinical assessment may 
actually detect two discrepant emotional states. These phenomena may undermine the 
cross-validity unless the two measurements are performed simultaneously. 
Establishment of an additional simultaneous “double blind control” design will help to 
eliminate this confounding factor (see the end of the section). 
For these complex reasons the psychological tools must be executed IN EXTENSO (ii) 
and simultaneously (ii) with the neuroimaging, the essay repeated within the same day 
(iii). 
 
Objectives of the project: 
 
The cross-validation pattern model is illustrated in the next figure. 
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Remarks to abbreviations and legend: 
Bmax : receptor density for D1, D2 and 5HT2a 
BP: binding potential 
Kd (dissociation constant): affinity 
 
In the right section of the figure there are presented two prototypes of disorders in the 
domain of clinical phenomena assessment with the respective assessment tools used in 
everyday practice. In the left section there are presented two correspondent sub clusters 
of data/methods assumed to penetrate into the biological mechanism of the disorder 
group listed on the other side. 
The model of cross-validation consists of two interwoven patterns: 
(i) ‘Orthodox’ correlation between the correspondent clusters of notions aiming 
at establishment of convergent validity: indicated with red arrows; 
Depression clinical 
measurement tools: 
 
McKinley& Hathaway 
Depression scale,  
Luscher color test 
Neuro-correlates 
With hypothesized  
Linkage to bipolar depression 
 
mCPP pharmacoMRI 
citalopram challenge  
Schizophrenia clinical 
assessment tools: 
McKinley and 
Hathaway Paranoia 
scale 
Luscher 
 
 
Neuro- correlates 
With hypothesized linkage  
To schizophrenia: 
 
pMRI with SDA: 
olanzapine challenge 
 
Prototype 
A: 
Affective 
disorder 
Prototype 
B: 
Psychotic 
disorder 
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(ii) First line open control: deliberate ‘paradox’ cross-validation of non-
correspondent constructs. In other terms this control serves the purpose of  
discriminate validity test: indicated with intersecting green arrows 
(iii) Second line blind control: measurement of the brain activity without any 
clinical data available 
(iv) Second line blind control: counterbalance of the experiment: clinical ratings 
and brain activity detection performed simultaneously in other segment of the 
circadian cycle.  
 
Hypotheses: 
 
1. The item groups (scales, series of items) have certain neuro-correlates, which 
differ among the experimental groups. We are looking at significant correlations 
of the psychological rating scale score and the pattern of BOLD activity, which is 
corresponding to the density and occupation of the respective receptor population; 
2. These neuro-correlates represent distributed (not localized) functional neural 
networks. For instance McKinley and Hathaway depression rating scale in 
depressive patients must correspond to activations of pathways which belong to 
distributed systems including nucl. accumbens, hippocampus, nucl. Amygdale, 
medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. On one hand these systems may exhibit 
operational properties of serotoninergic neurotransmission, demonstrated in 
pharmaco MRI with administration of 5HTR agonist such as mCPP. It is well 
known that limbic structures, hippocampus in particular have pluripotent re-
transcription properties and may exhibit various neuro-mediator components in 
respect to the specific functional state of the mind-and-brain system. Therefore 
similar neural structures but modulated with dopamine or glutamate/GABA may 
express in a pharmaco MRI experiment when correlated with e.g. McKinley and 
Hathaway paranoia scale or series of projective personality test (TAT, Rorschach, 
Lüscher) in patients with presumed diagnosis from the schizophrenia spectrum. 
This way we may demonstrate the differential role of multiple realizations at the 
level of the neuro-behavioral regulation and introduce complementary data to 
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contribute in neuroscience-informed psychiatric taxonomy and treatment 
strategies. 
3. The valid constructs in both psychological and neuro-imaging methods must 
operationally converge under prototype time-and-space correlations.   
4. All other constructs demand revision. 
 
 
EXPECTED RESULTS and outcome: 
 
On a theoretical level our project may reflect in a meta-empirical scientific program 
(agenda) for proactive research: fostering of the elaboration and validation of common 
used terms and notions. These proofs-based quasi axiomatic structures may secure the 
scientific foundations of psychiatry. On its hand being grounded on more or less 
uncontestable knowledge psychiatry may further expand the “inter-personal awareness” 
of the values and comprehensive assessment system. Eventually the concordance of the 
information from both values based and neuroscience-informed exploration can further 
endorse the Integrative classification and diagnosis project.  
In the field of clinical psychiatry the stabilization (‘scientification’) of knowledge can 
improve diagnosis, prevention and treatment procedures and contribute to the medical 
prognosis of disease. 
As it was already mentioned Eysenck’s dimensional diagnosis project was later supported 
by neuro-physiological data. However there are some arguments which restrict the 
normative functions of the dimensional model and its derivative factorial personality 
models in clinical diagnostic practice. Mainly the factorial methodologies refer to 4 or 5 
axial dimensions which is not satisfactory for comprehensive assessment and 
psychopathological diagnosis. On the other hand currently employed categorical 
diagnosis standards seem to be also irrelevant given the fallacies of DSM and ICD. 
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For this reasons we aim at endorsement of the prototype diagnosis with neuro-
imaging bio-markers. In this context our project is a long-term perspective, 
grounded on continuous and tangible convergence of clinical and neuro-biological 
operations. This entails determination of stable broad prototype taxonomic units 
demarcated with neuro-biochemical indicators and predictors of the drug treatment 
response.  
 
We take also into serious consideration the argument of Broome and Bortolotti (2009) 
that biomarkers can not serve as sole diagnostic criteria. This is why we aim at epistemic 
“frame shift” of the current taxonomies towards “high umbrella” prototypes, further 
extended/ superposed with narratives of the person centered comprehensive 
assessment.  However the strong evidence (matching the criteria of specificity, 
sensitivity, validity and reliability) can deliver the necessary, though not sufficient (!) 
foundation for the establishment of bi-conditional law-like constructs between 
neuroscience and clinical psychiatry. A valid bi-conditional connection sets a 
methodological prerequisite for conformable dialog (i) or problem-oriented integration of 
neuroscience and psychological disciplines (ii). 
It may further expand the fields of exchange and interplay ability of the methods and 
data, respectively can enhance the unification of the common used scientific terms and 
criteria for validity. Finally the interplay ability and unification underlies the possible 
effect of minimization. Minimization is directed to collection of maximum significant 
data with minimum resources capacity invested. Basically in the case of psychiatry this 
means revision (re-validation) of the clinical psychological assessment tools according to 
the evidence from the simultaneous cross-validation with neuro- imaging methods. As a 
result we shall rely upon inexpensive instruments for exploration of mental disorders. 
Besides the diagnosis our project can potentially reflect the prevention and treatment, 
especially the drug choice and therapeutic monitoring. 
 
*** 
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Provisional protocol: 
 
Group A: Prototype of presumed affective psychosis 
Group B: Prototype of presumed psychotic disorder from the schizophrenia spectrum 
Group C: Healthy individuals 
 
Counterpart method 1: battery of clinical assessment tests  
 
Counterpart method 2: pharmaco fMRI: regions of interest include cortico – limbic 
functional circuit, operating with 5HT, dopamine, and glutamate/GABA. 
 
Administration: 
 
Simultaneous, double-blind, placebo controlled, counterbalanced within the same day, 
next segment of the individual circadian rhythm 
 
Study design for group A: 
 
• Experimental condition: depression + paranoia clinical rating scale and mCPP 
infusion/citalopram challenge. 
• Control condition: paranoia scale  
• Alternative condition (optional): olansapine or ketamine challenge 
 
Study design for group B: 
 
• Experimental condition: paranoia scale + depression rating scale and olansapine 
challenge 
• Control condition: depression scale 
• Alternative condition (optional): idem 
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